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ABSTRACT 
 The need for coordinated efforts to respond to emerging crises, disasters, and conflicts 
has become ever-more apparent in the past decade.  As events occur more frequently, at a larger 
scale, and the 24 hour news cycle associated with cable networks and the web-based media 
enhanced the public’s exposure to disasters, the need for coordination has become more 
apparent.  To that end the United Nations implemented the Cluster Approach.  In the decade 
since its deployment, starting with the Pakistan Earthquake of 2006, little independent academic 
research has been conducted to assess the approach.  Instead, the literature tends to be confined 
to two camps: internal after action reports from the United Nations and editorials in respected, 
though non-academic journals, such as Slate Magazine.  The following paper suggests 
exploratory research be done to assess whether the coordination approaches utilized by the 
Cluster Approach are proving to be beneficial, efficient, and functional. 
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
Cluster…………………………….. A UN designated formal grouping of non-governmental 
organizations with a similar mission  
Gatekeeper……………………........ A key stakeholder in research that provides access to 
possible interviewees 
Intergovernmental Organizations… A formalized, often regional, cooperative grouping of 
national entities developed for a specific goal 
Intimacy………………………….. The degree to which an organization has specific knowledge 
of local governmental, cultural, and other structures in a 
given region  
NGO……………………………… Non-governmental organization 
UN………………………………... United Nations 
Utility…………………………….. The degree to which an organization or type of organization 
is better suited to conduct specific tasks than others 
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SECTION 1. INTEGRATION, STANDARDS, AND VANTAGE POINTS 
 Today’s international, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seem to be suffering 
from a split personality.  A quick search of the internet can find volumes of praise for the heroic 
deeds of NGOs around the world.  The same search, however, is likely to find significant 
criticism of NGOs including very serious charges about the ethical soundness of their behavior.  
Such criticism comes from politicians, professionals, and academics, and its volume has 
arguably increased over the last two decades as one major, international disaster after another 
seemingly raises new questions about how NGOs are doing their job (Hilhorst, 2002). 
 Critics have raised questions about accountability, reputation, cultural sensitivity, and 
utility.  Each of these issues has its own dynamics, and each of the issues has triggered an array 
of specific solutions.  However, one particular, recent, international disaster played a special role 
in highlighting several of these issues—the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004.  The effort to 
coordinate the international NGO response to the tsunami clearly left much to be desired and 
highlighted some of the general issues noted above.  Soon after this disaster, enthusiasm began to 
build around a new organizational concept for coordinating NGO activities.   
 In an attempt to standardize humanitarian work in the NGO sector the UN commissioned 
the development of the so-called Cluster Approach to Humanitarian work.  This approach sought 
to address the commonly perceived weaknesses within the NGO sector.  Developed as an 
integration model, the Cluster Approach seeks to provide oversight and accountability to the 
sector, validating NGOs in the eyes of the world.  With appropriate integration and management, 
it was argued that waste in the non-governmental sector as well as outright corruption could be 
minimized.   
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 Events quickly overtook general discussions of the Cluster Approach as another major, 
international disaster, the Pakistan earthquake, led to the approach’s implementation on the fly.  
The approach seemed to offer some promise, so it has now been adopted by the United Nations 
as the way to coordinate international NGO response to major disasters (IASC Operational 
Guidance, 2007) and has been used in several subsequent events (e.g., in 2008 and 2009 for 
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan, respectfully, and in 2010 for 
the Haitian earthquake, see NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project, 2010).   
 With the approach’s increasing use, it is now time to raise several questions:  a) to what 
extent, if any, do members of NGOs view the Cluster Approach as an improvement over pre-
Cluster Approaches to disaster response; b) do NGO members believe that the Cluster Approach 
has and/or can address one or more of the more general, significant criticisms that have been 
aimed at past NGO behavior; and c) if the Cluster Approach is perceived as a potential problem-
solver for one or more such issues, how do NGO members perceive that the Cluster Approach 
has and/or can do this?  These are the questions that should be explored in future studies through 
interviews of a diverse, purposive sample of NGOs and selected NGO members who have 
participated in the Cluster Approach during one or more international disaster response efforts. 
 The research heretofore performed on the Cluster Approach falls into one of two 
categories.  First, the UN has done its own assessments of its own program (e.g., OCHA 
Evaluation and Studies Section, 2007), and these assessments are generally positive while noting 
a few areas for improvement.  The assessment formats follow that of corporate public relations 
reports. Second, there have been a number of anecdotal and editorial critiques by single 
individuals participating within the Cluster Approach.  These critiques are primarily opinion 
pieces, even political attack pieces, and not based on empirical assessments (McCabe, 2002; 
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O’Connor, 2011).  Thus, little or no systematic, empirical research from outside UN auspices 
exists on the Cluster Approach.  This gap is understandable given the recent emergence of this 
approach to NGO disaster work, but it is also a serious gap in light of the commitment that has 
been made to the continued use of the approach.  Future projects should seek to highlight this 
gap and to begin to address it with an exploratory study involving in-depth interviews of selected 
participants from various NGOs who participated in the UN’s use of the Cluster Approach.  The 
following paper concludes by offering a model of how such a study could be done. 
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SECTION 2. APPROACHING THE PROBLEM: MODELS IN LITERATURE 
 
 The literature regarding international humanitarian response is focused largely on key 
aspects that are modeled, often by weaknesses, in the body of work.  Accountability, Reputation, 
Cultural Insensitivity, and Utility are all focal points in literature that guide literature to discuss 
the degree to which these touchstones play a role in humanitarian work.  For 13 years, at the time 
of this paper, research has focused on the need to address these key models, while largely 
ignoring the paradigm developed to oversee how they fit within humanitarian work.  Instead of 
assessing the structure responsible for holding these aspects in focus, overwhelmingly the body 
of research has instead focused on hashing out, and rehashing previous non-conforming 
paradigms, such as the Red Cross Code of Conduct, and Sphere Standards.  It seems peculiar that 
in the more than ten years since the development and implementation of the Cluster Approach, 
there has been such a minimal attempt to explore how the paradigm addresses the ongoing 
struggles in the field, to what degree the paradigm has mitigated those struggles, and how the 
paradigm can continue to build.  
Current Concerns About NGOs 
 Accountability.  The broad mission of NGOs is to serve those in need.  Thus, NGOs are 
first and foremost morally accountable to this audience as part of their mission.  Meanwhile, 
NGOs are also held accountable by those that provide funding and resources, and to their own 
employees and volunteers for completing their work.  These diverse audiences can create cross-
pressures that can set the stage for mismanagement and even corruption.  A variety of NGO 
scandals have shown accountability, or the lack thereof, to be a significant NGO problem (Moore 
et all, 2003). 
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 Accountability issues differ by the size and power of the NGO.  Some NGOs operate 
strictly at a national level.  Eriksson and Sadiwa (2001) recognize that these organizations often 
seek to create social change or alter local domestic policies to be more fair in regard to 
international law or the humanitarian imperative.  In addition, there are regional, and 
international NGOs with much greater scale and level of resources that are often dedicated to a 
particular cause throughout the world, rather than several social issues in a target location 
(Eriksson and Sadiwa, 2001).  Locally based NGOs generally are more understanding of 
recipient needs, but lack the power to make broad changes for the betterment of their clients.  In 
contrast, larger NGOs and multilateral organizations generally hold the power to make a broad 
impact, but may lack the on-the-ground sensitivity to recipient needs.  In what Suparamamian 
and Dekkar call a “paradox of power” (2003, p. 312), very rarely do groups or NGO workers 
have both on-the-ground knowledge and power.  Those groups or workers who feel most 
accountable may have little power to be accountable, while those who have the power to be 
accountable, may not feel the pressure or have the knowledge to do so.  One result of this 
“paradox of power” is that accountability is not uniform throughout the NGO sector.   Authority 
in humanitarian work is generally concentrated among the more powerful groups (Rubenstein, 
2007).  If authority, whether legitimate or not, is compounded in the hands of groups without the 
knowledge of how to appropriately act, a disconnect between what is expected of NGOs and 
what they actually deliver is likely to only accelerate over time.   
 To address this, various systems of standards have been offered aimed at putting NGO 
groups on a relatively level playing field (Rubenstein, 2007).   Observers note that it is as 
essential for large and powerful groups holding physical capital (e.g. funds and staffing) to adopt 
these standards as it is for smaller weaker groups that have a local hold on social and cultural 
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capital (local knowledge of populations and adaptation mechanisms). Some of these guidelines 
benefit from being absolute, that is, “perfect obligations that are consistent across contexts and 
do not admit of degrees” (Rubenstein, 2007, p. 622).  For example, “perfect obligations” or 
standards would include prohibitions against NGOs being involved in murder, theft, graft, or 
lying to benefit themselves.  However, the appropriate use of other rules is less obvious.  Less 
absolute or “imperfect standards” are far more complicated.  These arise when considering things 
such as effectiveness and efficiency (Rubenstein, 2007, p.622).  In short, room for relative 
interpretation mitigates the unanimous adoption of these standards across NGOs. 
Alternatively, NGOs can adopt their own standards for their work, but when groups do 
this, the sector suffers from inconsistent rules.  Several sets of NGO specific standards and codes 
of conduct have been developed by NGOs in the humanitarian field.  For example, the Red Cross 
Code of Conduct guides the Red Cross, and any other group that chooses to adopt it (Hilhorst, 
2005; 354).  Such a self-imposed standard can be useful to enhance accountability, but it leaves 
the individual NGOs the flexibility to interpret what the standard means.  As an example the Red 
Cross Code of Conduct, Article One states, “the humanitarian imperative comes first.”  At first 
glance this appears to be a reasonable guideline for behavior, even noble.  Though self-imposed, 
how could there be an accountability issue here?  Nevertheless, without a clear definition for the 
phrase, “humanitarian imperative,” this Article becomes difficult to implement, and the judge of 
the implementation’s success is the NGO doing the implementation.  Moreover, the Article has 
no gauge by which to measure whether the “humanitarian imperative,” whatever it may be, did 
in fact come first, or whether that imperative was appropriate for the given context (Hilhorst, 
2005).  In sum, this ethical code lacks clarity and teeth. 
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 To combat the problems associated with ethical and moral codes that are simply self-
imposed and/or lack clarity and practicality, the Sphere Standards were established in 1997 
(Gostelow, 1999).  The Sphere Standards’ goals are two-fold.  First, the standards address 
conduct from practical and assessable vantage points, and second, the standards seek to unify 
humanitarian work by incorporating NGOs into one overarching body to promote consistency 
across NGOs.  In effect the Sphere Standards seek to provide a governing body of and for NGOs.  
Sphere Standards measure effectiveness and efficiency of tasks completed.  To do this, the 
Sphere Standards approach offers “an operational framework for accountability in humanitarian 
response” (Gostelow, 1999; 318).   
Sphere Standards potentially create a context within which a much clearer and unified 
approach to accountability for NGOs exists (Gostelow, 1999).  This approach codifies a single 
language for NGOs to use to streamline communication and the overall process of humanitarian 
work.  The standards provide an assessment baseline and develop a backdrop to assess and 
evaluate projects.  Sphere Standards can aid in the coordination of projects and the work of 
NGOs.  Finally, the projects can be vetted to help guide, clarify, and specify goals. 
While the above benefits are recognized, the consortium approach, at least as 
demonstrated by the Sphere Standards, is confronted with several obstacles (Griekspoor and 
Collins, 2001).  Primarily this approach has the opposite problem faced by the Red Cross Code 
of Conduct.  If the former had no teeth to hold groups accountable, the latter is stricken with 
lockjaw.  The Sphere Standards are too specific, and even the minimum standards take too much 
for granted about an NGO’s resources.  Resources of NGOs are often not substantial enough to 
meet these minimum standards, or even when resources are available, logistical concerns, often 
beyond the control of the NGOs themselves, obscure the appropriate utilization of their resources 
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(Griekspoor and Collins, 2001).  Because of these limitations, small NGOs often become 
scapegoats for the inadequacies of host countries and donor nations. 
Thus, this consortium-based approach to standards is not without its critics.  The Sphere 
Standards face the problem of limiting the creativity and ingenuity requisite for effective work in 
the humanitarian field (Gostelow, 1999).  Further, blame becomes the focal point when 
circumstances go awry, rather than a focus on problem-solving.  Additionally, the consortium 
approach limits the autonomy of member groups, and limits the diversity of groups, practices, 
and approaches.   New groups could lose funding as they fail to immediately meet minimum 
standards.  Political will could color humanitarian work making the Sphere Project no more 
neutral than NGOs acting under the strict direction of their home governments.  Smaller groups 
could be seen as inferior to international and global NGOs.  Finally, the consortium approach 
clearly displays its origins in the developed world. 
Other approaches have been suggested to address specific accountability concerns.  For 
instance, to address assessment, focused audits of NGOs, both internal and external, can be and 
have been done (Hilhorst, 2002).  Specifically, humanitarian groups often employ social and 
performance audits to assess the quality and effectiveness of their work.  Both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are utilized in these assessments to gauge success.  External groups 
especially can provide fresh eyes to assess an NGO’s outcomes.  This approach to accountability 
faces the question of who has the respect and authority to do the audit.  And, again, the audit 
approach challenges the autonomy of NGOs making them answerable to outside, auditing 
organizations and to possible sanctions.   
These issues could be mitigated by relaxing the audit approach to one more similar to a 
peer review process (Hilhorst, 2002).  The peer review process takes the sanctions emphasis 
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away from the auditing approach while still examining quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of 
the NGO’s work.  The peer review process benefits both the reviewer and the reviewed.  The 
reviewer gains insight into approaches not necessarily seen before in their own work, and the 
reviewed organization gains an outside assessment of its work.  If either group perceives a 
weakness, it can draw from information derived through the partnership to try to strengthen it.  
Similar reviews could be utilized to address the financial success or failure of organizations. 
While steps have been taken to address accountability issues throughout the NGO sector 
the concern with accountability remains.  Codes of conduct, standards, audits, and peer reviews 
are steps toward a more accountable sector, but they have yet to be fully accepted.  Further steps 
need to be taken to provide organizations throughout the sector equal footing and still ensure 
accountability of all NGOs to their mission.  The suggested study will guide consideration of the 
extent to which participants in the Cluster Approach after a given emergency perceive the 
integration of NGOs into functionally based clusters encourages or hampers problems with 
accountability. 
 Reputation.  Related to concerns of accountability, the reputation of non-governmental 
organizations has fallen under increasing scrutiny in the last two decades.  Beginning with the 
media’s real-time exposure of events in Rwanda in 1994, the number of organizations in the non-
profit sector has been exploding.  The increasing severity and cost of natural disasters, along 
with expanding 24/7 media coverage world-wide, also has triggered the emergence of more 
NGOs.  Even if the percentage of all NGOs involved in ineffective or even inappropriate 
activities remains the same, the explosion of NGOs sets the stage for more NGOs, numerically, 
that can harm the reputation of the sector as a whole.  Furthermore, the overlap of natural 
disasters with local and regional conflicts has meant that the definition of what “humanitarian” 
10 
 
work is has become more and more diffuse.  It is less clear whether NGOs are indeed doing or 
not doing what they claim to be doing in their humanitarian mission statements (Hillhorst, 2002).  
Some question if the expansion of NGOs is little more than a fad to be exploited for publicity, 
and additional funding in what appears to be a growth industry.   Hillhorst (2002) notes that with 
the growth of the sector comes increased competition for resources, diffuse or missing 
coordination, and scattered cases of unprofessionalism, graft, political preference, and conflict 
mongering. 
In fact, these colors of corruption do exist to some degree (Smith, 2010).  At its worst, 
some members of the NGO sector are exploitative profiteers of instability.  Smith offers Nigeria 
as an example of an economy where corruption has become commonplace throughout the 
country’s economic system and where this corruption creates an environment for the creation of   
NGOs solely to exploit the availability of donor dollars to help the poor.  In turn, with 
governmental corruption in unstable countries a frequent problem throughout the continent, 
legitimate NGOs often seek to avoid involvement in the state and become quasi-governmental 
agencies in their own right. 
In addition, the reputation of NGOs has been harmed by other stake-holders (Pitner, 
2000).  Often repressive governments develop organizations labeled as “humanitarian 
organizations” to stifle NGOs seeking to provide a voice for previously quieted populations.  
Pitner (2000) points to Tunisia, where the government created its own “NGO organizations” 
under the leadership of the Tunisian intelligence service.  Similar organizations have been 
developed as champions of foreign governments’ interests.  Ironically, these “humanitarian” 
organizations are on the rise while more genuine foreign funding sources such as United States 
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Agency for International Development and the European Commission are forced to tighten purse 
strings. 
These blatant attempts at subterfuge however are not the only instances of NGOs being 
seen as just another arm of a foreign power.  According to Frangonikolopoulos (2005), when 
NGOs aid militaries with humanitarian actions, the NGOs actually aid in advancing the political 
agenda of that military’s home-state.  This is often combined with a dichotomy of mission.  
While NGOs are generally focused on long-term agendas, the tasks of militaries generally 
support short-term goals.  Regardless of this inconsistency, Paul (2003) notes that military 
groups are usually seen as groups with the infrastructure and ability to distribute aid, assist in 
redevelopment, et cetera.  Nevertheless, the cooperation of military organizations and NGOs 
creates a slippery slope.  The autonomy of NGOs comes into question, risking the reputation of 
the NGO sector (Frangonikolopoulos, 2005). 
Alternatively, Harsh (2010) notes that the reputation of NGOs as a sector is threatened 
not so much from underhandedness, subterfuge, or blatant corruption, but rather from 
technological lag.  Technology and business practices in the private sector dominate the 
expectations of organizational culture as a whole.  Advances in record keeping technology, 
telecommunications, medical technology, infrastructural technology, et cetera throughout the 
business sector raise standards throughout all sectors.  Meanwhile the tight budgets of NGOs are 
sluggish or altogether incapable of keeping in step with their for-profit counterparts.  How can 
NGOs do good if they are not good at what they do? 
 While the reputation of NGOs is often outside the control of individual organizations, the 
sector as a whole has taken substantial blows.  Often the weaknesses discussed regarding NGOs 
are due to a poor understanding of the challenges they face rather than actual failures.  Funding 
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and access can be challenging, and NGOs may find partnerships with organizations across 
sectors (e.g. military organizations) to be unavoidable.  Future studies should seek NGO 
participants’ perspectives on the extent to which clustering the activities together of NGOs 
enhances their effectiveness and reputation by reducing some of the complications of working on 
their own. 
 Cultural Insensitivity.  Yet another accusation facing today’s NGOs is that there is a 
certain level of cultural insensitivity in how NGOs sometimes respond to the needs and beliefs of 
help recipients (Breslau, 2000).  This lack of intimacy with diverse cultures is evident when there 
is a cultural mismatch between what is needed and what NGOs supply.  The accusation has been 
focused on Western NGOs.  When Western culture is forced to fit over non-Western cultures, 
both potential needs and potential points of resiliency can be overlooked.   
 To illustrate this, McCabe (2002) points to aid policies that impose regulations on 
recipients, while failing to incorporate local practices related to economic coping.  This practice 
can force recipients into a state of dependency.  When assistance is concentrated in a single 
location, local populations consolidate on the aid centers and traditional reciprocal aid networks 
are eliminated.  He points to Turkana pastoralists to demonstrate this.  “One of the main reasons 
why recovery was so difficult was that those families that had migrated into the famine camps 
found their pastoral friends and neighbors were less willing to give them live-stock to recover 
from drought.  Many successful Turkana felt that residents of the famine camps had spurned the 
traditional system and would not make good exchange partners (McCabe, 2002; 227).”  To 
compound this issue, development strategies employed by NGOs and multilateral organizations 
that were more in line with Western development abandoned low yield drought resistant live-
stock on communal land for higher yield, more vulnerable live-stock.  While higher yield 
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animals may have a moderate positive impact on national resources, the local populations did not  
see these same benefits,  and the practices actually increased their vulnerability (McCabe, 2002).   
  The benefits of utilizing local cultural and social capital go beyond mere familiarity of 
local populations and a passive notion that needs are being overlooked.  There are benefits of 
engaging local culture as well.  Garcia-Acosta (2001) recognizes that intimacy with local 
cultures allows for groups to have a better understanding of adaptation strategies specifically 
catered to local geographic, economic, and political practices.  When these practices are ignored, 
or worse, actively opposed, vulnerability increases (Oliver-Smith, 2002).  Examples of this date 
back as far as Spanish colonization of Peru.  Utilizing traditionally Spanish practices, or those of 
the developed world forces the local population in to new and maladaptive settlement patterns.  
The disadvantages of cultural insensitivity were also evident during the 1986 Ugandan relief 
where, “local skill sets of the Ugandan refugees, potentially lucrative or valuable for livelihood 
schemes, were disregarded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and outside 
programmes were foisted upon Ugandans as though they were homogenous, unskilled peasants 
(2006, 1144).”   
 Today, NGOs are generally aware of these issues even if the issues remain.  A focus on 
local, social and cultural capital is growing exponentially.  Dijkzeul (2006) recognizes a growth 
in the role of local culture reflected in the literature.  However, while it is recognized that local 
culture should be incorporated in response planning, there is little suggestion as to how this may 
be done.  Perhaps, the Cluster Approach is one answer.  Those developing this approach have 
expressed the hope that clusters will provide some vertical integration around a given functional 
need, such as health, such that smaller NGOs on the ground can communicate more directly the 
cultural needs and beliefs of help recipients to larger NGOs high up the cluster hierarchy.  
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 Utility.  Despite concerns about accountability, reputation, and cultural insensitivity, 
NGOs have existed for many decades and are expanding in number today because they do fill 
major needs in response to and recovery from major disasters.  There is certainly much that can 
still be done to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of NGOs, but much has already been 
done, and the inherent character of NGOs as a unique organizational form demands that any 
changes in the coordination of NGOs in the field, that is, a change such as the development of 
the Cluster Approach, must maintain NGO’s current utility to those in need. 
 By their nature, NGOs have specific advantages relative to other types of organizations 
(e.g., government agencies, businesses) in providing help, especially to those on the margins of 
society with few resources to exchange for help.  These advantages can play out in two dynamic 
ways.  First, the mission of NGOs typically focuses on services, rather than profits.  This is a 
significant organizational advantage.  NGOs can focus their energy on service utility, that is, on 
doing all that can be done for those in need without concern about the extent to which the service 
being provided is profitable.  This freedom from concern with profit allows NGOs to play a 
variety of key roles.  Aldaba (2002) notes that NGOs can play the following five roles in 
disasters and conflict settings:  intermediary, capacity builder, conflict manager, resource 
mobilizer, and networker/coordinator.  As intermediaries, NGOs can offer neutral locations for 
stakeholders to assemble.  In neutral locations, partnerships and programs can be developed and 
implemented.  As capacity builders, NGOs can offer training (e.g., how to build safer structures) 
and promote vulnerability reducing awareness (e.g., providing HIV reduction education).  As 
conflict managers, NGOs can mediate between or among contentious groups (e.g., unifying 
survivors of a particular event and their government).  As resource mobilizers, NGOs often have 
access to diffuse resources and can mobilize these resources when typical donors cannot come 
15 
 
through as expected.  Lastly, as networkers/coordinators, the small size of many NGOs relative 
to multilateral organizations and governmental agencies, allows NGOs to navigate on-the-ground 
needs and concerns.  Thus, free of concern with profit, NGOs have the organizational flexibility 
to enter the fray of a disaster or conflict and serve in a variety of demanding roles. 
   Second, the utility of NGOs is enhanced by their semi-autonomous existence with respect 
to their homeland and their recipient nations.  NGOs benefit from being “sovereignty free actors 
(Thakur, 1994; 147)” and are not driven by the interests of their homelands.  This allows NGOs 
to be more responsive to vulnerable populations than nation-states, and multilateral 
organizations.  This autonomy can involve actually circumventing the recipient nation’s 
government when that government is unstable and/or corrupt (Paul, 2003).  Paul (2003) notes 
that funds in highly politicized disasters often get tied-up at the state level and never trickle down 
to their intended target populations.  However, in less politicized events, foreign NGOs are better 
able to engage in direct relief and are encouraged to do so because multilateral organizations and 
larger foreign governmental organizations often prefer to fund development indirectly through 
NGOs as a means to bypass potentially unstable or corrupt governments.  Thus, autonomy within 
recipient nations means that NGOs are often able to go where other organizations dare not to go 
due to local political or social barriers.  In addition, NGO autonomy provides flexibility to play a 
number of key roles internationally.  According to Thakur (1994; 152), NGOs can “play five 
distinct roles in international relations: conscience raising or value promotion; agenda setting; 
lobbying to shape the terms of the instructions given to delegates at multilateral and IGO 
[multilateral] forums, and implement international commitments; monitoring; and direct action.”  
Thus, regardless of accountability and reputation issues, the perceived utility of NGOs has 
increased as the severity of disasters has increased (Moore et all, 2003). 
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  Clearly, the advantage of operating without concern for profit and in a semi-autonomous 
manner are unique advantages for NGOs relative to other organizations in disasters, especially 
international disasters, and the implementation of the Cluster Approach should not hamper such 
advantages.  Thus, a future study should examine the extent to which selected NGO participants 
in the Cluster Approach perceive that the advantages of NGOs have been maintained and the 
concerns about accountability, reputation, and cultural sensitivity have been addressed. 
The Cluster Approach:  Its Origins and Early History  
 The UN’s Cluster Approach was developed as a way to coordinate NGOs and to integrate 
their efforts with local, regional, state, and national governments, the private sector, and multi-
lateral organizations (e.g., the UN, European Union, and African Union (IASC Operational 
Guidance, 2007)).  The approach is intended for use where a major emergency requires a multi-
sectoral response with participation of a wide range of international humanitarian actors (IASC 
Operational Guidance, 2007).  Clusters are organized at the global scale, and by nation-states 
(Street, and Parihar, 2007).  The goal of this dual organization paradigm is to bolster general 
humanitarian systems overall, while addressing recognized local needs.     
 The Cluster Approach organizes NGOs by their basic function.  For example, health, 
sheltering or security.  However an inconsistency between global and state cluster labels exists.   
While the global divisions may incorporate food and sanitation into one cluster, and healthcare in 
another, specific state clusters may incorporate sanitation into the healthcare cluster and leave 
food out as separate.  In turn, clusters are spearheaded by “cluster lead organizations.”  These 
organizations provide overall leadership for each cluster.  This structure then becomes the means 
by which NGOs are coordinated in their response to international disasters. 
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A weak response during the 2003 Darfur crisis highlighted the humanitarian arm of the 
UN.  Particularly, it brought about criticisms that this arm, OCHA, was too integrated into the 
military and political facets of the UN to adequately serve as a non-biased contributor of 
humanitarian aid (Streets et all, 2012).  With the weaknesses during the Darfur response as well 
as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and the Humanitarian 
Response Review, recognized key points that needed to be addressed.  Two of these key points 
were standby arrangements and coordination (United Nations, 2012).  The Cluster Approach was 
presented as a way to address these two fundamental, as well as several other secondary, 
weaknesses (United Nations, 2012).   
The test case for the Cluster Approach was conducted in response to the 2006 Pakistan 
Earthquake (Street, and Parihar, 2007).  The results were mixed.  Problems with the approach 
came early in its initial implementation.  Cluster meetings were held in English limiting the 
involvement of some local NGOs.  Meetings failed to recognize the issues brought up by groups 
with more intimate knowledge of local needs.  The failures of clusters to integrate with local 
NGOs decreased the buy-in of those NGOs who saw meetings as a distraction from actually 
doing work in line with their missions.  Further, cluster meetings were held too frequently and 
focused too narrowly.  This strict direction of groups ignored the capacity of NGOs engaged in 
several activities.  Clusters failed to incorporate local civic, cultural, and governmental 
organizations.  Groups not recognized by the UN charter were not sought out to engage within 
the Clusters, limiting the number of stakeholders and potential resources involved.  Finally, 
leadership tasks were not clearly defined or delegated causing confusion about the 
implementation of the paradigm.  These outcomes were in part due to a lack of buy-in from 
organizations on the ground, as well as a lack of enthusiasm by groups that did participate.  
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Nevertheless, the UN has continued the development and implementation of the Cluster 
Approach.  
The Cluster Approach:  Addressing Current Concerns  
 Given the obstacles NGOs face in the current international climate, the Cluster Approach 
could be a solution for many concerns.  Such an integration mechanism could provide a unified 
starting point to oversee, prioritize, expand the success of, and hold accountable organizations 
participating in the model.  Presumably, the concerns associated with accountability, reputation, 
cultural sensitivity, and utility can be addressed by integrating organizations. 
 Accountability.  Despite repeated weaknesses, the Cluster Approach aims at solving real 
issues.  Most importantly, accountability has been a major concern throughout the NGO sector.  
NGOs can judge their success or failure against their own overall goals, but critics of the sector 
recognize a lack of unifying principles across NGOs as a whole.  The NGO sector looks 
disjointed and chaotic.  NGOs remain susceptible to accountability concerns. Systems of 
standards have yet to fully address this situation.  In contrast, the UN designed Cluster Approach 
ideally enhances cooperation and consistency throughout the sector, and such coordinated 
activity could be a route to greater, sector-wide accountability as NGOs compare and contrast 
their efforts.  Future studies should explore perceptions of cooperation, coordination, and 
accountability in disasters employing the Cluster Approach.  The present paper will present a 
model for such a study (see chapter 3). 
 Reputation.  The reputation of NGOs has fallen under increasing scrutiny in the last two 
decades (Hillhorst, 2002).  The utilization of clusters could serve to provide oversight and a 
degree of consensus on what is considered humanitarian work.  Further, clusters could serve as a 
type of clearinghouse aligning reputable organizations with similar missions.  Finally, the pooled 
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resources envisioned by the Cluster Approach could provide an alternative funding source to 
foreign governments providing a clear distinction between the interests of foreign governments 
and the interests of non-governmental organizations based in foreign states.  If the Cluster 
Approach were to accomplish all of these ideal outcomes, the reputation of the NGO sector 
would most likely improve. 
 Cultural Sensitivity.  The integration sought by clusters could serve to minimize one of 
the greatest weaknesses inherent in the effort by external NGOs to be of help in cultures that are 
quite distinct from the homeland cultures, that is, the problem of cultural insensitivity.  Thakur 
(1994) recognizes the essential role NGOs play in international humanitarian affairs.  Through 
cluster-based integration, the intimate relationship that smaller NGOs share with local 
populations and cultural structures are not wasted due to lack of resources. Their on-the-ground 
knowledge can be spread among other NGOs, including much larger ones, that all are addressing 
the same functional needs.  Working with local structures could redirect policies toward being 
more in-line with the practices and needs of the populations to be served. 
 Utility.  Regardless of the seemingly faltering reputation of the NGOs, their perceived 
utility or potential utility increases (Moore et all, 2003).  The structures created by the Cluster 
Approach do not appear to undermine either the focus of NGOs on service rather than profit or 
the ability of NGOs to operate semi-autonomously in foreign lands—both key utilities for NGOs.  
Still, the increasing use of the Cluster Approach demands attention be given to any latent 
developments associated with the approach that might either harm or enhance these utilities. 
 Need for exploratory research.  It is time for an exploratory study to begin the 
examination of the extent to which the Cluster Approach is addressing or exacerbating some of 
the fundamental concerns existent in the general literature on NGOs.  The concerns have been 
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frequently expressed about the NGO sector as a whole, but little or no effort has been made to 
address the extent to which these concerns are addressed by the most widespread restructuring of 
international NGO efforts in recent history.  In fact, there is very little empirical research, at least 
research by non-UN researchers, to study any aspect of the Cluster Approach.  Research should 
be conducted directing attention to this surprising absence of research on the Cluster Approach 
and specifically addressing perceptions of the extent to which the Cluster Approach is impacting 
sector-wide concerns. 
Since 2006 the Cluster Approach has been deployed in over 40 countries for events 
ranging between civil conflicts, to famine, to natural disasters.  Notably the model was deployed 
in response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake (O’Connor, 2011).  During the earthquake response 
several of the above noted issues arose yet again along with new dilemmas.  Power and authority 
remained concentrated in the traditional cadre of organizations including the UN and those 
organizations with the longest lasting ties to it.  Once again, local NGOs and local populations 
were left out of the conversation.  Further, the decision making process remained undefined and 
chaotic allowing for no clear regulation within each cluster (O’Connor, 2011).  The Cluster 
Approach faced some of the issues in Haiti that the general NGO sector has faced. The Haiti 
disaster involved major distribution in an underdeveloped country requiring the involvement of 
numerous NGOs at all levels from around the world.  Such a disaster requires the coordination 
promised by the Cluster Approach and represents the type of disaster where the Cluster 
Approach is truly tested.  Thus the present paper uses the Haiti Earthquake as a sample disaster 
to illustrate how a study of the Cluster Approach could proceed.   
As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, a proposed exploratory study could 
begin research on the Cluster Approach and general, sector-wide concerns about international 
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NGOs with an exploratory research effort. The proposed effort would involve in-depth 
interviews of selected participations with open-ended questions and associated more focused 
probes to allow participants both to freely provide their perceptions of the approach and to 
respond specifically to the issues such as accountability that have been covered above. 
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SECTION 2. CREATING NEW KNOWLEDGE: HOW TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP 
 
Overview 
 In order to properly assess how successful the Cluster Approach has been in focusing the 
humanitarian sector with regard to humanitarian crisis, research must delve into the actual 
workings of the Cluster Approach.  To date, the majority of research on the topic has largely 
been comprised of anecdotal criticisms and technical reports that arguably offer extreme views in 
both directions of the paradigm.  While anecdotal reports are largely critical of the work 
conducted under the purview of Clusters throughout the world, technical reports seemingly hand-
wave away legitimate concerns as simply minor complexities that should be explored to 
maximize success of what is presented as an already successful endeavor.  To address these gaps 
in research, the voices of the subjects that the Cluster Approach seeks to unify should be 
consulted.  To that end research should be conducted to gain insight into the perspective of the 
NGO members.   
Choice of Site 
 The present paper suggests a research project that would begin to document and analyze 
the voices of NGO members involved in the Cluster Approach.  A future study should look at 
strengths and opportunities in the existing literature for implementation of the Cluster Approach.  
Such a study would look at qualitative methodologies, specifically in depth interviews to 
implement exploratory research to sow seeds of further research.  These interviews would give 
voice to representatives of member NGOs, that the organizational structures seek to aid. 
An ideal study would seek to conduct semi-structured telephone interviews with 
representatives of non-profit organizations engaged in a national Health Cluster in response to a 
particular event, such as Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.  Focusing on one cluster function (e.g., 
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health), one location (e.g., Haiti), and one disaster (e.g., the 2010 earthquake) should help to hold 
constant a number of major contextual factors that could otherwise complicate perceptions of the 
approach’s operation.  This allows interviewees to address a common pool of experiences and 
needs.  At the same time, holding these factors constant significantly limits any generalizability 
the findings might have, but such a limitation seems preferable in an initial exploratory study.  
The hope is to gain in-depth knowledge about one, specific location and event within the 
evolution of the Cluster Approach before seeking an understanding of how significant contextual 
variables might alter the cluster’s operation.   
Sample 
The selection of a sample presents several challenges both administrative, and logistical. 
One solution would be to interview participants in the meetings of NGO representatives within 
the Health Cluster both during and following the disaster.  Such NGO representatives should be 
uniquely able to observe the interaction of NGO members working within the cluster framework.  
Thus, study participants would be sought from among these NGO representatives who are 
involved in Health Cluster meetings following a disaster (Warren, 2001).  In addition, these 
meetings might provide documentary evidence that participants in the cluster actually met and 
coordinated these activities. The hope would be to interview meeting participants representing 
several different NGOs in a cluster such as the Health Cluster.  Efforts will be made to 
purposively include both local, and international NGOs, in hopes of gaining the richest data 
possible. 
It should be noted that the staffing in these meetings can often be somewhat ephemeral. 
Turnover in NGO staffing can be swift, and assignments in large organizations can be temporary.  
This provides both opportunities, and challenges.  While the turnover provides a greater pool of 
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individuals to interview, the brief tenure in these positions could limit the potential for snowball 
sampling necessary to effectively expand the pool of interviewees.   
 The biggest challenge anticipated in this sampling effort is gaining access to the initial 
interviewee—someone who has participated in these meetings as an NGO representative.  
Perhaps the most effective route would be to use a prominent participant in the overall response 
to a disaster as a gatekeeper (Taylor and Bogdon, 1998a).  Once such a name is provided, then 
future participants hopefully would be identified via snowball sampling.  Regardless of the 
gatekeeper, a copy of the minutes from any such cluster meeting could prove instrumental if it 
had a list of participants, and such a list should be sought. 
Procedures 
 Should the interviewees prefer a degree of confidentiality measures should be taken to 
provide it, however some, particularly those involved in smaller NGOs may prefer to be 
identified as this may be the first opportunity for their voices to be heard in an academic setting.  
First and foremost, at the behest of interviewees, the names of interviewees and the names of 
their organizations should not be mentioned (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998a).  Further, all 
documents, recordings, and transcripts of or related to interviews should be kept on the 
researcher’s personal, password protected computer.  All data should be kept only until research 
related to the data is complete exceeding no more than four years and then destroyed.  The 
information regarding each interview should be given a generated numeric identifier rather than 
being saved with interviewee’s names or organizational names.  At the onset of each interview a 
drafted privacy statement regarding the recording of the interview as well as the steps taken to 
ensure privacy should be read aloud to the respondent, and they should be given the opportunity 
to end, or continue with the interview (Warren, 2001).  Physical, legal, or emotional harm 
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associated with this research (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998a) as well as any professional risks of 
harm should be mitigated by the previous attention given to privacy.  
 Initial contact with selected participants should most likely be via email.  The preferred 
technology for the interview is phone.  However, it may prove impossible to contact some 
interviewees by phone in which case questions could be provided via email. 
Interview Guide 
An interview guide should guide the semi-structured interviews (Taylor and Bogdan, 
1998a).  Questions ought to be broad and oriented toward the organizations that work in the 
humanitarian field, as well as their engagement in the Cluster Approach, and related to 
organizational needs and how they are fulfilled, such as resources, staffing, et cetera.  
Additionally respondents should be probed to create even richer data.  Interviews should range 
from 30 to 90 minutes. 
 The goal of the open-ended questions is to determine to what degree the criticism of the 
NGO sector is recognized by NGO  participants themselves as well as how the Cluster Approach 
has been implemented to ameliorate these obstacles.  Further, questions should be designed to 
specifically explore the perceptions of the Cluster Approach’s impact on accountability, 
reputation, intimacy and utility.  Thus, if these issues are not covered during responses to the 
open-ended questions, probes should focus on the issues of accountability, reputation, cultural 
sensitivity, and utility.  Suggested question are provided below.  The questions proceed from a 
broad focus on the NGO sector, to the respondent’s NGO, to the Cluster Approach, and finally to 
interactions within the Cluster.  
1) Can you describe the general state of the international NGO sector? 
 Function of NGOs in general? (Utility) 
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 Perceptions vs reality? 
 Relative to other sectors? (Utility) 
 Reputation? 
 Corruption? 
 Military partnerships? (Corruption) 
 Are expectations reasonable? 
 Benefits of direct vs. indirect aid 
2) Describe your organization and its function. 
 Role 
 Scale  
 Challenges faced specific to your organization 
 Funding through donations or grants? 
 Measures of Strengths and Weaknesses? (Accountability) 
 Growth and Improvement? (Accountability/Audits) 
 Integration with other organizations prior to cluster involvement? 
 Integration after cluster involvement? 
 NGOs of different scale (Paradoxes of power?) 
 Uneven resources (intimacy) 
 Codes of Standards (standards) 
3) Can you describe the successes and failures of the Cluster Approach? 
 Successful integration? 
 Benefits of integration? 
 Clear leadership? 
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 Partnerships with other sectors? 
 Integration with local authorities? 
 Increased accountability/response capacity? 
4) To what extent do you perceive NGOs buying into the Cluster Approach? 
 Language barriers? 
 Overly bureaucratic?  
 Limits on focus of NGO? 
 Picking favorites? 
Data Analysis 
 Recorded telephone interviews should be transcribed immediately following each 
interview.  Each interview should be treated independently for sake of transcription, receiving 
individual document files with a randomly assigned number label to ensure confidentiality 
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1998b).  Preferably, transcription should be completed by the primary 
researcher to monitor confidentiality and learn the data.   
 Emerging themes should be drawn from the data throughout interviews (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1998b).  Themes could be anything from common vocabulary, topics, or repeated 
concerns.  All themes should be laid out and attention most closely paid to those themes most 
prevalent throughout the data.  Attention should also be paid to drastically opposing perceptions, 
and potential causes for the different perceptions (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998b).  From there, 
narrative can be developed exploring the voices of those interviewed. 
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to this research.  First and foremost this project should not, 
nor would it be intended to be generalizable.  Instead, it should simply be an exploratory study.  
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Second, participation may be limited based on potential participants’ limited time to participate.  
Third, the nature of this study would face some of the same limitations common among the 
humanitarian field, and outlined in critiques of the Cluster Approach itself.  Primarily, linguistic 
barriers hinder inclusion of organizations without English speaking representatives.  Further, the 
technological dependence on telephone interviews could serve to hinder the inclusion of small 
organizations with single remote offices where telecommunications are sporadic or limited.  
Finally, this study would begin by focusing only on organizations that are currently, or have 
previously been engaged within the Cluster Approach, but future research is needed on the 
perceptions of the Cluster Approach by those NGO members that have not been integrated. 
Hopefully, the proposed, exploratory study will trigger research efforts that will begin to address 
these initial limitations. 
Conclusions  
 While several obstacles exist in conducting this study in regard to access, technology, and 
logistics, it is important to recognize the substantial potential of the outlined research.  As the 
world grows ever more toward a global community, increasingly, global approaches such as the 
United Nations and other integration mechanisms are going to be the chief way to solve critical 
emerging problems. 
 With luck the bureaucratic obstacles that seem to cast negative light on these processes 
can make way for a systematic focus aimed at solutions before blame.  Research could seek to 
determine if concepts like accountability, reputation, cultural sensitivity and utility can be served 
through these top-down approaches, or if they remain stubborn buzz words in the professional 
vernacular.
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